By Lawrence Phillip Knight, Ph.D.
Texas A&M University-Kingsville
BECOMING AN AMERICAN CITY ECONOMICALLY:
BUILDING A RAILROAD TO SAN ANTONIO IN THE 1850S
American has been discussed in terms of morals, assimilation, politics, ethnicity, ideology, and conflict. What was true in those areas was also true in economics; there was an American economy, and nothing personified it more than the railroad after 1830. A town could not become a city in the United States without a railroad, nor could a city remain a city. The evidence of this American phenomena was enormous. As early as 1825 advocates of a railroad between Philadelphia and Pittsburgh lamented the fact that New York had more people than Pennsylvania--but the railroad would remedy that. Crops "languish[ed] from the difficulty or impossibility of conveying" them to market--but the railroad would remedy that. Farmers were cut off from the goods of the city--but the railroad would remedy that. Manufacturers in the state's interior were cut off from both Philadelphia and Pittsburgh--but the railroad would remedy that. The state's reserves of coal, iron, marble, and timber, were left untouched or wasted--but the railroad would remedy that. The railroad was the remedy for all economic ills--the railroad was the El Dorado of American in the 19th century. What was true for Pennsylvania was true for New Orleans which, until the completion of the Erie Canal in 1825 monopolized the trade east of the Appalachian Mountains. Throughout the early 1830's railroads were chartered in and around New Orleans to capitalize on its location before canals and railroads in other parts of the country made its location obsolete. Nashville joined with New Orleans in a railroad venture for the same reason--if a city was to remain one and grow it must have a railroad. Louisville joined with Nashville on a railroad for the same reason, and St. Louis joined in the rush to build railroads lest its favorable location on the Mississippi River also be bypassed by iron rails that needed few natural advantages. In Texas, Harrisburg, Houston, Galveston and a host of other towns also saw the gathering of city leaders and interested citizens to plan railroads. The same was true of San Antonio, which in 1850 had a free population of only 3,168.
Although San Antonio experienced commercial growth with the beginning of the war with Mexico, no project was perceived as more economically important than getting a railroad to San Antonio. The leaders of the city believed, as did leaders in cities throughout the country, that only a railroad could make San Antonio into a city. San Antonio was already the conduit through which much of the commerce to and from El Paso, Santa Fe, Chihuahua, and the Pacific traveled, but only with a railroad would that commerce continue to travel through the city. Proof of the perceived importance of the railroad was revealed by the quickness with which Bexar County and the city of San Antonio each committed $50,000 in bonds with which to purchase stock in the railroad. Bexar County and San Antonio were not alone; Victoria, Calhoun County, LaVaca, Indianola, and other towns that hoped to be connected by the railroad also authorized the use of public funds to buy stock in the railroad. But regardless of who offered money or land in exchange for stock or to insure that the railroad went through their community or county, the railroad was, in the 1850s, run by men who themselves were leaders in San Antonio. Further proof of the perceived importance of the railroad was that no other attempt to develop the city brought more of the city leaders together or took more of their time.
The economic context within which building the railroad was attempted was also evidence of the perceived importance of the railroad. San Antonio did not need the railroad to save a stagnant economy; the city was flourishing. A few figures from a list of taxable property showed this growth. Town lots in San Antonio grew in value from $266,232 in 1850 to $1,364,149 in 1855. Merchandise in the city grew in value from $113,600 in 1850 to $374,080 in 1855. Not only was the city experiencing economic growth, but so was its hinterland. The total value of property in Bexar County rose from $918,408 in 1850 to $4,740,609 in 1855. Nevertheless, the leaders of the city believed that the only way to secure the area's wealth and increase its prosperity was to link San Antonio to the rest of the world by rail.
The men first elected to the board of the San Antonio and Mexican Gulf Railroad were familiar names in the city; all were in some position of city leadership: Samuel A. Maverick, president, Benjamin E. Edwards, secretary, and board members J.H. Beck, Bryan V. Callaghan, Thomas J. Devine, J.M. Devine, Francis Giraud, John J. Giddings, Enoch Jones, J.S. McDonald, John D. McLeod, Robert S. Neighbors, I.A. Paschal, Sam S. Smith, and Gustavus Schleicher of De Witt County (Schleicher soon moved to San Antonio). A common characteristic among them was their wealth, a characteristic they hoped the railroad would enhance. Thirteen of the fourteen San Antonians were listed in the 1850 Census. Their total real estate holdings were $139,140 or an average of $10,703. Only one of the group, Smith, had no real estate holdings; McLeod was the next lowest with $640; the highest real estate holdings were those of Sam Maverick with $31,000. What was most surprising was the absence of Tejanos on the board; no Tejano ever served on the board. Considering the popularity of some of the Tejano leaders, especially the Navarros, who also owned stock in the railroad, it seems likely that had one of them wished a place on the board he could have had one. Unlike the Tejanos, Germans, though few in number, were on the board from its beginning. From 1851-1855 four Germans served as board members: Gustav Schleicher (who will be covered more in depth in chapter VIII), C.N. Riotte, H.F. Oswald, and Jacob Waelder.
From 1850 to 1855 the board members of the San Antonio and Mexican Gulf Railroad worked to build a railroad from the Gulf Coast to San Antonio. These men were successful in many endeavors, not the least of which was government at the local (city and county) and state levels. Yet when the board quit meeting in February 1855, not one foot of rail had been laid, and San Antonio was no closer to the promised prosperity of the railroad than it had been in 1850. Why had the project failed? The primary reason was the lack of capital. Texas had much land but very little money. The leaders of the railroad were able to garner thousands of acres of Texas land in the name of the railroad, but they were not able to turn that land into capital, and without capital the railroad could not be built. Two examples make the point. On October 7, 1851, a Committee on Finance was established to do three things: purchase land, pledge stocks for the lands purchased, and hypothecate lands and other assets of the company as security. The problem of lack of cash was apparent. Land was to be purchased, but paid for not in cash, but in railroad stock, stocks that would have true value only after the railroad was built. Also the company would hypothecate assets--the company would take the lands it had paid for without cash and turn those lands into securities with which it would support the company. The jarring redundancy here was lack of cash. Lack of capital was also the reason the local firm of Jones and Devine was given the contract. They agreed to take company bonds instead of cash as payment, in fact only one other firm submitted a bid to construct the railroad, and one of their demands was a great deal of capital prior to construction.
Lack of capital was not the only problem facing the railroad. The men who sought to build the railroad, despite their success in other ventures, had no experience in building one. This was evident when they admitted, in late 1853, that railroad construction was vastly more expensive than they had realized. What was true for the board was equally true for Jones and Devine, although Jones had worked on canal locks and dam building.
A final reason for failure was lack of consistent and unified leadership. Two examples are noteworthy: the turnover rate of the board members and the failure to choose a coastal terminus. When the board quit meeting in 1855, only Giddings, McLeod, Paschal, and Maverick remained of the original members. Similarly the office of president was often in flux as was shown by the resignation of J.Y. Dashiell twice. Nor was the critical decision on a coastal terminus decided. The railroad charter allowed the board to choose as its coastal terminus any point between Galveston and Corpus Christi. The optimal point turned out to be on Matagorda Bay, either at LaVaca, Indianola, or Saluria, the latter located on St. Joseph's Island. The board members naturally wanted the best deal available and played these three towns against each other, receiving land and money, or at least the promises of those, from each; but rather than choose one, and use the assets gained, the board members argued among themselves and never chose a terminus, resulting in the alienation of all the coastal towns and of the inland town of Victoria as well. Rather than getting the most profitable deal for the company, the board members ended up getting no deal.
The leaders of San Antonio spent much effort between 1851-1855 in attempting to build a railroad. Though a failure in general, the project was not without some successes, including securing a charter from the state legislature, the gathering of huge amounts of land, and the establishment of a board to oversee the railroad. The failure must also be seen in the context of the time. The vast majority of charters issued in Texas during this time resulted in few railroads, and most had far less success and longevity than the San Antonio & Mexican Gulf Railroad--which was still alive if not moving at the end of this period. In most cases the failure was attributable to one overwhelming fact. Neither Texas nor San Antonio had the capital to build railroads.
After a layoff of thirteen months, the board of the San Antonio and Mexican Gulf Railroad met in March 1856 with a serious intent to build the railroad. In the interim Paschal, acting as president, offered the city a way out of its stock obligation. If the city agreed to pay 10 percent, or $5,000, of the original $50,000 it owed, the railroad would absolve the city of further debt. The city agreed to the terms, adding only that if the railroad owed any money to the city the railroad would pay it.
Within three months of this offer, the board once again commenced meeting regularly, a practice that continued for three years, and a sign that the board meant to build a railroad from the Gulf coast to San Antonio. Sensing that the road would become a reality, but only if the railroad retained its largest stock holder, the railroad board refused to authorize the city's acceptance of Paschal's $5,000 offer, a decision made easier by Waelder's determination that Paschal's offer was illegal.
Meanwhile the citizens of San Antonio were informed and encouraged by the local papers about the bright prospects for the railroad, and cajoled to invest in the company's stock. In April and May 1856 the Herald reported that the railroad had been reorganized, that the citizens of San Antonio needed to support the railroad, and that prospects for the railroad were bright--rumors had it that an investor from the North was in town and interested in purchasing stock in the road. The Ledger echoed the need of the citizens to support the railroad by urging the people of San Antonio to buy railroad stock. The Ledger also reported that a contract to build the railroad had been let. Certainly, it seemed, that the railroad was becoming a reality--the paper even suggested using slaves as laborers to get the railroad built more quickly.
For a bright moment it seemed as if the railroad would be built. After working for most of 1856 there was true progress on the railroad. An article copied by the Herald from the Victoria Advocate, revealed that fourteen miles of the road had been graded between Lavaca and Victoria, a cargo of cross-ties had been received with more on the way, the iron necessary to complete the first section had been purchased, and the "interests of the road [were] in a prosperous condition."
The euphoria did not last long. President of the railroad, W.J. Clarke and Maverick returned to San Antonio from New York City in February 1856 with devastating news. Clarke and Maverick had been well received in New York. According to the Herald, the railroad bonds were proclaimed on Wall Street as the best ever offered by a new railroad. What made them attractive was the 10,240 acres of land for every mile of road constructed, especially since the estimated cost of the road was only $21,000 per mile. Under these assumptions Clarke and Maverick had negotiated the railroad bonds at eighty-five cents on the dollar and the railroad agent in New York had "purchased the iron, machinery, and rolling stock." As in a cheap melodrama, however, moments prior to the contracts being signed one of the buyers' lawyers discovered that the railroad could only offer eight sections instead of sixteen to the mile, and the deal was not consummated.
The Herald, which reported the debacle, thundered that the Bexar county delegation to the state legislature was either stupid or negligent. In a great oversight when the San Antonio and Mexican Gulf Railroad's charter was extended, the Bexar delegation did not get the charted amended to include the additional eight sections to the mile that the state offered. Regarding the sixteen sections for each mile, and thus for the future of the railroad, the Herald reported that they were "non-com-at-ibrus-in-swampo!" Coupled with the failure to sell the bonds, was the fact that the railroad's agent had signed contracts for materials to construct the railroad. Thus the road faced its stiffest challenge.
To meet this challenge many of the board members signed personal pledges to keep the road solvent. The road needed $75,000 to meet its immediate obligations, and the board determined that $25,000 of that could be realized by selling railroad land in Port Lavaca. Of the $50,000 remaining, leading men in San Antonio pledged $37,000; Maverick's pledge of $12,000 was the largest by far, followed by Guilbeau's of $5,000, and others that ranged from $500 to $3,000. What possessed these men to risk their hard won fortunes on a venture that to date had produced no revenue and seemed likely never to produce any? These men were members of an America that believed that without the railroad their city was doomed. In a real sense, they were not risking anything; investing money on a railroad venture that might fail was no more a risk than keeping the money and ensuring the failure of the railroad and with it the eventual demise of the city. For San Antonio to be an American city, it must have a railroad.
Further bad news was reported in April. The Herald commenting on the remarks of "a southern gentleman traveler" noted that his opinions gave them "the more reason to fear that San Antonio has now lost all power to control the railroad enterprises that are to fix her destiny." The gentleman's views were that the railroad needed to have is lower terminus at Galveston Bay. The failure of the San Antonio and Mexican Gulf Railroad to begin there meant that a railroad would be built with a terminus there, and that it would not be built by "San Antonio men." In fact any railroad coming from there now would either arrive at San Antonio from Houston via Austin, making San Antonio a mere backwater, or the railroad would run from Galveston to Eagle Pass bypassing San Antonio altogether. Whether the southern gentleman's predictions were true or not, the San Antonio and Mexican Gulf Railroad appeared doomed. On the same day that the gentleman's observations were reported the Herald also reported that further negotiations between the railroad and prospective creditors had failed and that the company was expected to let its charter expire and perhaps apply to the next legislature for a renewal of it.
What good news there was for the railroad came mostly from the coastal terminus. The Lavaca Herald reported that despite the failure in New York, the road from Lavaca to Victoria would be finished, and despite the setback work progressed from the Lavaca end. In fact thirteen miles of land was graded and ready for cross-ties in June, 1857, and as summer ended actual rails had been laid. True the distance, seven tenths of a mile, was short, but it was a real start after many years of merely a paper railroad.
Even as the railroad construction progressed, however, an event occurred in June that would later end San Antonio's control of the railroad. Following their unsuccessful trip in early 1857, Clarke and Maverick returned to New York City and entered into a contract with Reid and Tracy for railroad material, mostly iron. However Reid and Tracy demanded a mortgage on the company as collateral; thus, any failure by the board to fulfill the contract meant the end of the railroad, at least as controlled by men from San Antonio. It was this agreement, or the inability of the board to meet the terms of it, that ended the San Antonio and Mexican Gulf Railroad.
With the loan from Reid and Tracy and the need to get the railroad built, the board entered into a contract with a Robert W. Dunn of Port Lavaca and Thomas S. Rogers of San Antonio to build fifty miles of the railroad. The board also purchased a used locomotive from the Taunton Locomotive Manufacturing Company for $5,000, and eight platform cars, four box cars and one hand car for $7,700 ($8,000 in San Antonio city bonds).
Following the near demise of the railroad the news began to improve. An article copied from the Lavaca Herald noted that not only had track been built but that a locomotive, "a veritable steam engine [was] puffing and blowing, snorting and whistling along the line." While the length of the completed tracks was not mentioned, the paper predicted that the road would extend to Victoria within fifteen months.
Money, however, remained a problem, and the city of San Antonio, the major stockholder in the company, was of little help since it had no money to pay its indebtedness to the railroad. Meanwhile the company sought ways to get money owed it and came up with three ways. Collectors were sent out to get either installments on the delinquent stock or the stock itself, the mayor of San Antonio was asked for the interest due on the San Antonio bonds, and the county of Bexar was also contacted regarding non-payment. The endeavor met with limited success, though the city promised to reinstate the 1850 railroad tax to collect the money owed the railroad. In January 1858, the board also acted on its promise to reclaim stock from those who had not paid for it. The Ledger reported that Clarke announced that under the charter the railroad had the right to sell stock that had been issued but not paid for. The sale would be held at the end of the month, and in the interim a list of the delinquent shareholders would be published in the local papers. The list included 24 names and 131 shares of stock upon which something had been paid and 122 names and 395 shares of stock upon which nothing had been paid. The total due on the stock was $14,517.50, and Clarke warned the delinquent stockholders that even if their stock was sold at auction they were liable for the difference in the sale price and the original price of the stock plus the interest on the money not paid. To further insure some capital, two plots of land of 400 and 410 acres were sold. A more important land deal was also made with the company of Swenson & Swischer; eighteen certificates of land were transferred to the company. The certificates represented land promised to the railroad, and each certificate represented 640 acres of land. Swenson & Swischer were to act as agents of the land and to sell each certificate for not less than $210. Meanwhile the railroad would borrow money on the land not yet sold.
While the railroad labored under financial duress, construction on the road continued. By the end of January the line was three and one-half miles long, and one of the leading citizens of San Antonio, W.A. Menger, rode on the railroad and reported his observations to the Ledger. The railroad, though barely begun, he reported, eliminated some to the worst road between Lavaca and the interior, and the railroad was being used.
[C]ountry people come down with their wagons laden with country produce, to the termination of the road, and there take the cars and transfer themselves and their goods to Lavaca. So far as finished, therefore, the line is in most complete and successful operations.
The paper then urged that those delinquent stockholders, and those who had not purchased stock, reconsider and support the railroad. The success of the railroad, the Ledger promised, and the help of the legislature in land grants "set the matter at rest."
A report the next month showed that construction on the road was moving rapidly. The Ledger noted that the road was now five miles long. The reporter noted that he had traveled in a stagecoach over muddy roads to reach the railroad. The railroad, however, was not bothered by the mud and traveled at the astounding rate of twenty miles per hour. He too believed that the success was secure since "it is supposed the iron and ties, since the passage of the relief bill by the legislature, can easily be procured on the bonds of the company," and he believed the railroad would reach Victoria within six months.
Even the governor's office noted that the project was making progress. To ensure that state lands promised to railroads were earned, the governor sent William Fields, the state engineer, to verify the claims of railroads. On February 18 and again on March 8, Governor Runnels ordered Fields to verify the progress of the railroad. Initially he was ordered to verify that five miles of the road were complete, and in March he was sent to verify
that twenty miles or more of said road has been graded and ready for the crossties in addition to the completed sections of said Road and that said company therefore claims the benefit of 'An Act Supplemental to an act entitled An Act to encourage the construction of Rail Roads in Texas by Donations of Land; approved Jan. 30th 1854.
However problems remained. Dunn and Rogers were fired as contractors because they failed to fulfill their contract, and recovering delinquent stocks proved difficult. To remedy the latter situation, board member C.E. Jefferson was authorized to buy the delinquent stock from the subscribers. On stock on which something had been paid he was allowed to offer up to 25 percent of what had been paid, and even on stock on which nothing had been paid he was allowed to offer ten cents per share. The reason for what seemed a rash measure to a company desperate for cash was that Clarke, who would return to New York soon, was to carry the stock with him and hypothecate it there. He and the company secretary Keen, from Lavaca, soon traveled to New York City in an attempt to trade $500,000 in company stock for railroad materials.
Meanwhile a new contractor, D.A. Clark of Lavaca, was hired and the board, in the absence of Clarke, sought for revenue to fund continued construction. In a small yet meaningful decision the board refused to allow Luciano Navarro to pay for his remaining stock debt with land. Apparently the board realized that cash, not land, was needed to finish the railroad. The board also agreed to further trade land for materials and decided to use the land certificates that the state granted for completed construction. The board also voted to transfer the land certificates sent to Swenson & Swischer to D.M. Swenson of Austin for $250 each. Also the board called upon stockholders to pay their eighth 5 percent subscription payment.
By May 1858, it appeared that the board had staved off disaster, and that the railroad would not only survive but grow. At least that was the thought of long time board member Paschal when he promised the Sunday school children of San Antonio that each of them would get a free ride on the railroad when it reached the city, which, the Herald reported, "he confidently predicted would be much sooner than many supposed, in which opinion we fully confer." The paper also included an advertisement for the railroad that stated that the road was now five and one-half miles long, and reviewed in another article that the railroad would bring prosperity to San Antonio. The paper reported that the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad was 204 miles in length and had cost seven million dollars. However from 1850, prior to the railroad's completion, to 1856, when the railroad was completed, the property value along the path of the railroad rose $25,365,568. Good news continued throughout the summer. In July it was reported that the company had purchased twenty-five miles of rail which was about to be shipped--a number that was bested in September when Clarke and Keen signed a contract with an English company for fifty miles worth of iron. Perhaps better than either of those, though, was the report that the citizens of Lavaca had fulfilled their $100,000 stock subscription.
Regardless of good news and success, the specter of disastrous debt was never far away. This was shown by the decision of the board in October to put at jeopardy one of its most needed assets, iron. The decision of the board was to "hypothecate 2000 tons of iron as security to further grade the railroad and repay impending company obligations." Certainly the road needed to be graded before any iron was used, but using the iron as security showed just how tenuous was the financial status of the company. So bad were the company's finances that it went public and asked the citizens of San Antonio to contribute $20,000 to keep the road solvent, reminding all citizens that merchant, farmer, stock raiser, and mechanic, would benefit from the railroad.
Despite efforts to stave off financial ruin, the sword of debt that had hung over the head of the railroad since its inception fell in November. John C. French and John James, both prominent citizens of San Antonio, and the trustees in San Antonio for Reid and Tracy, were ordered by them to sell the property that was the collateral for the money owed to the New York pair. In a last ditch effort, Paschal tried to save the railroad. His adopted motion was that the railroad appoint a committee to determine exactly its debt and its assets in hopes of finding a way to keep the road solvent.
Paschal's action was successful, if only temporarily. In December the board learned that Secretary Keen had reached an agreement with Reid and Tracy. The railroad was given until September 1859 to come up with $10,000; in the meantime notes from citizens were accepted as collateral for the extension. The board, however, soon realized that the effort was doomed. At the end of January the board ordered Keen to return to Texas and told James and French to advertise the railroad and the franchise for sale on the first Monday in April 1859.
The public death knell of the San Antonio and Mexican Gulf Railroad sounded on February 8, 1859 when the Daily Herald ran an article entitled, "Important Trust Sale," on its front page. The sale was by James and French, trustees, and was for the assets of the railroad. The reason for the sale was obvious to anyone with knowledge of the railroad, debt. Ironically, the railroad's list of assets was long. The "road-bed, track, franchise, and chartered rights and privileges" were all for sale. Included in the assets were a
section of five miles and 1034 feet completed ready for and in actual use; twenty miles of the grading examined and approved by the State Engineer, and five miles of additional grading nearly completed; one twenty ton locomotive in good running order; and eight platform freight cars, and one hand car. About 10,000 crossties of the best quality, not laid down upon the road. One new turn-table which has not been put up.
More importantly, if a buyer with means could be found, all the rights of the charter, 10,240 acres of land per mile of completed railroad, could still be secured.
Still the board hoped that a railroad to San Antonio would be built and that they could have some part in it. An offer from Europe to buy the railroad spurred this hope, and the board authorized Clarke and Paschal to sell the road and its charter for no less than $50,000 in cash and $25,000 in stock in the new company. This too failed. The board met for the last time on March 28, 1859. At the meeting James and French were authorized to sell the franchise and "all rights and privileges of the company arising under [the] Charter." The vote to sell the railroad, voted by shares of stock, was 1,639 for and 34 against.
Ironically at the time San Antonio was losing control of the railroad, the railroad had become successful. An advertisement in the Ledger stated that the railroad ran from Lavaca to Chocolate Bayou, a distance of five and one-half miles and that the fare for passengers was forty cents each way while freight was hauled at four cents per hundred pounds.
When the railroad venture of the leaders of San Antonio is reviewed, the primary aspect of the railroad that one sees is not failure, but effort, not money risked but faith. Many of the leading citizens of San Antonio labored long and hard to establish a railroad link to the city; they also spent much money. Land was gathered, contracts signed, plans made, money borrowed, trips to investors and producers in New York and elsewhere taken, land graded, rails laid. For the first five years of the project no physical progress was evident, and from 1856-1859 less than six miles of track was laid. Yet to the last, the board, composed primarily of men from San Antonio, fought to build the railroad. While monetary concerns were important, belief was more so. Men of wealth did not gamble their wealth only in hopes of making more wealth via the railroad; men of wealth believed, like men of wealth throughout the United States, that only with a railroad could San Antonio truly prosper and become an American city.
Facts and Arguments in favour of Adopting Railways in Preference to Canals in the State of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia: William Fry, 1825; reprint, New York: New Arno Press, 1970), 55-57 (quotation); Merl E. Reed, New Orleans and the Railroads: The Struggle for Commercial Empire, 1830-1860 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1966), 3-20; Maury Klein, History of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1972), 2-5; Ira G. Clark, Then Came the Railroads (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1958), 12-17; S. G. Reed, A History of the Texas Railroads and of Transportation Conditions under Spain and Mexico and the Republic of the State (Houston: St. Clair Publishing Co., 1941), 56-83.
San Antonio Western Texan November 13, 1852; Frederick Law Olmstead, A Journey Through Texas, or, A Saddle-Trip on the Southwestern Frontier (New York: Dix, Edwards, 1857; reprint, Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978), 152-153; San Antonio, Council Journal, Book B, December 30, 1850, 119 (City Clerk's Office; cited hereafter as SACCO); San Antonio Ledger, April 3, 1851; The Indianola Bulletin, April 15, 1852.
H.P.N. Gammel, (comp.), The Laws of Texas 1822-1897 (10 vols.; Austin: Gammel Book Co., 1898), 3, 814; United States Seventh Census (1850), Bexar County, Texas, Population Schedules; San Antonio Western Texan, Sept. 23, 1852; San Antonio Ledger, Oct. 6, 1853; Julian P. Greer, "The Antebellum History of the San Antonio and Mexican Gulf Railroad (M.A. thesis, Southwest Texas State University, 1968), 74, 77.